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Pacific Gas & Electric: Opening the Door
To State Regulation in the Nuclear Field
I.

Introduction

The Supreme Court, in upholding a California statute
imposing a moratorium on the construction and licensing of
nuclear power plants pending federal government approval
of a permanent disposal program for high level nuclear
wastes, finally opened the door to state-initiated
participation in nuclear regulatory matters.
Unlike more recent federal regulatory schemes affecting
the environment, the Atomic Energy Act of 19461 made no
provision for state involvement. 2 To the contrary, it was
meant to create a federal government monopoly in nuclear

matters. 3 Amendments in 19544 and 19595 permitted but did
not define state involvement.6 This left much in question.

1. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2011-2282 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
2. Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948)
(current version at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), commonly
referred to as the Clean Water Act, see 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. V 1981)), the states
have an essential role in constructing sewage treatment plants, 33 U.S.C. §§ 12811293 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), and the maintenance of the permit program for
pollution discharges, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342-1345 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. V 1981) also gives states the primary
responsibility for the permit program established under the Act. Under the scheme
of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981), the states have a primary and essential role in the regulation and
management of hazardous waste.
3. S. Rep. No. 1211, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15, reprintedin, 1946 U.S. Code Cong.
Serv. 1327, 1330. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S.
59, 63 (1978).
4. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, § 271, 68 Stat. 919, 960 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2018 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
5. Act of Sept. 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-373, § 274, 73 Stat. 688 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
6. Section 271 of the 1954 amendments, supranote4,statedthattheActwasnot
meant to interfere with existing state authority concerning electric power, which,
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The state of California injected itself in 1974 into the
nuclear regulatory field with the Warren-Alquist Act. 7 No
legal challenge arose, however, until 1976 amendments to
the Warren-Alquist Act imposed, among other things, a
moratorium on the construction and certification of nuclear
power plants in California until the development of a
federally approved permanent disposal program for high
8
level nuclear wastes.
In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources
Conservation & Development Commission,9 the Supreme
Court upheld California's statute against a preemption
challenge brought by local utilities based on the Atomic
Energy Act and its amendments. This is the first time a
state statute in the nuclear area has survived a preemption
challenge before the Supreme Court. In dealing with the
issues asserted by the parties, the Court reached a
defensible, but unpersuasive position. It can be argued,
however, that California's position was molded from the
beginning to withstand a preemption attack while
accomplishing a preempted purpose. Further, the more

presumably, was meant to include nuclear generated electric power. Congress did
not define what the state authority or permissible involvement was. See infranote
19. Section 274 of the 1959 amendment, supra note 5, expounded a program for
state-federal agreements to elicit state involvement in the nuclear regulatory field.
Some roles for states were set out, such as performing inspections (subsection (i))
and state assumption of some federal regulatory functions (subsection (b)). These
were, however, contingent on the development by the states of competence in these
areas comparable to that of the federal regulatory agency. All these contingent
and discretionary grants of participation were still far from being a clear
definition of state involvement. See infra note 19.
7. Warren-Alquist State Energy Resources Conserv. and Dev. Act, Cal. Pub.
Res. Code §§ 25000-25968 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983) [hereinafter cited as WarrenAlquist Act]. This Act sets forth a regulatory scheme the purpose of which is to
"establish and consolidate the state's responsibility for energy resources" (§
25006) and "assure statewide environmental, public safety, and land use goals." (§
25007).
8. Warren-Alquist Act, §§ 25524.1-.3.
9. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conserv. & Dev.
Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 1713 (1983) The decision of the Court was unanimous. Justice
Blackmun, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred urging the Court to extend a
state's right to regulate in the nuclear field to include health and safety matters.
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crucial issue in this case is a state's sovereignty over its own
territory.
This note examines the legislative and common law
background of non-federal involvement in the nuclear
regulatory field. Pacific Gas & Electric is analyzed against
its own historical development, as a constitutional
interpretation inconsistent with precedent and authority,
and as a lost opportunity to examine a vital issue in the
juxtaposition of state environmental regulation against
federal supremacy. The conclusion suggests that, after
Pacific Gas & Electric,states may initiate regulation in the
nuclear field if the regulation is couched in economic terms.
II.
A.

Background

The Atomic Energy Act and Its Amendments

With sharply etched images of the ruins of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki in mind, Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act
(AEA) of 1946 to ensure that the development and use of this
new force would be regulated strictly and solely by the
federal government. 10 In 1946, "atomic energy was then 95
percent for military purposes, with possibly 5 percent for
peacetime uses."" Eight years later the field was opened to
the private sector for commercial development and further
promotion of nuclear power, 12 but it was still under the tight
rein of the federal Atomic Energy Commission (AE C). 13 The
states were given a gratuitous acknowledgement in a 1954
amendment that "the authority or regulations of any

10. See S. Rep. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1954 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 3456, and in 1 Legislative History of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, at
749 (1955).
11. 1954 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3458; 1 Legislative History of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, at 751.
12. S. Rep. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1954 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 3456, 3459.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The Atomic Energy Commission was
renamed the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by the Energy Reorganization Act
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, § 201, 88 Stat. 1233, 1242 (1974). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5814,
5841-5891 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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Federal, State or local agency with respect to the
generation, sale or transmission of electric power" produced
14
by facilities licensed under the Act would not be affected.
In 1959, almost as an afterthought, the states were granted
a limited and loosely defined role in the nuclear regulatory
field with the inclusion of section 274 in the Atomic Energy
Act. 15 This amendment provided, among other things, that
"[n]othing in this section shall be construed to affect the
authority of any state or local agency to regulate activities
for purposes other than protection against radiation
16
hazards."
A search in the legislative histories of the 195417 and
195918 Acts for clarification of what Congress meant by
"authority" and "purposes" reveals little.19 The entire
14. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, § 271, 68 Stat. 919, 960 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2018 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
15. Act of Sept. 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-373, § 274, 73 Stat. 688 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). It was said by the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy that this bill is "interim legislation," that it
expected increased use of atomic energy in the future, and that the "bill is intended
to encourage states to increase their knowledge and capacities...." S. Rep. No. 870,
86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprintedin 1959 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2872,2879-80.
This hardly signals a well-planned and well-defined role for the states.
16. Act of Sept. 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-373, § 274(k), 73 Stat. 688,691 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1976)).
17. See generally S. Rep. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1954 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 3456.
18. S. Rep. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprintedin 1959 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 2872, 2872-83.
19. Senator Hickenlooper, floor manager of the Senate bill, intoned the
following perplexing statement of "purpose ' He said section 271 of the 1954 Act
was a "positive negation of any intent...to interfere with the existing laws and
existing authorities, State and Federal, that have to do with electricity." 100 Cong.
Rec. 11709 (1954), reprinted in 3 Legislative History of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, at 3834 (1955). In trying to explain the state authority the new Act intended to
preserve, Senator Hickenlooper said:
We take the position that electricity is electricity. Once it is produced it should be
subject to the proper regulatory body, whether it be the Federal Power
Commission in the case of interstate transmission, or State regulatory bodies if
such exist, or municipal regulatory bodies. We feel that there is no difference
and that it should be treated as all other electricity which is regulated by the
public. [Section 2711 is designed to keep the regulatory authority exactly as it is
now, traditionally and under the law.
100 Cong. Rec. 12015 (1954). This statement also provides little guidance.
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exercise may be viewed as a meaningless political gesture to
the states in response to existing confusion about the
20
division of regulatory responsibilities.
Although the legislative history of the 1959 Act as
reprinted in U.S. Code Congressional& Administrative
News is entitled "Atomic Energy-Cooperation with the
States," 21 analysis of the Act shows the provision for federal
delegation of authority to a state by agreement 22 as the only
specific attempt to clarify what might emerge as the new
shared responsibility of state and local governments. What
was perfectly clear was the specific reservation of federal
authority "to regulate for protection against radiation
hazards." 23 This authority ultimately encompassed the
areas of nuclear safety and waste disposal 24 at issue in
Pacific Gas & Electric.
In the 1959 Act's legislative history 25 the issue of state
authority free from federal interference 26 was finally
addressed. The Joint Committee Report announced the
intent not to "impair the State authority to regulate
activities of AEC licensees for the manifold health, safety,
and economic purposes other than radiation protection." 27
What was actually left to the states, then, was "authority"
in the economics of nuclear regulation, a virgin concept at
that early stage of nuclear use, and in health and safety

20. S. Rep. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprintedin 1959 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 2872, 2872-83.
21. 1959 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2872.
22. Act of Sept. 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-373, § 274(b), 73 Stat. 688,688-89 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
23. S. Rep. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprintedin 1959 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 2872, 2883.
24. Act of Sept. 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-373, § 274, 73 Stat. 688 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021(c)(3), (4) (1976 & Supp. V 1981), 42 U.S.C. § 2201(b)
(1976 & Supp. V 1981), and 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (1976)).
25. See S. Rep. No. 870,86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprintedin 1959 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 2872, 2872-83.
26. Act of Sept. 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-373, § 274, 73 Stat. 688 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1976)).
27. 1959 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2882.
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issues other than radiation hazards. The latter, however,
were not specified or even suggested.
Against this background of uncertainty, it is not difficult
to see why state and municipal governments attempting to
assert authority in the nuclear regulatory field have met
with judicial confusion and unwillingness to expand an illdefined authority.
B. Non-Federal Ventures into the
Realm of Nuclear Regulation
In the past fifteen years, state and local governments
attempted to regulate nuclear activity within their borders
to protect their citizens. 28 With few exceptions, these
regulations fell to preemption challenges.29 In almost every
case, the state was trying to exercise its police power to
30
protect the safety and welfare of its citizens.
28. See South Dakota Pub. Util. Comm'n v. FERC, 690 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1982);
Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1982); Illinois v. Kerr-McGee
Chem. Corp., 677 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1982); Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota,
447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972); County ofSuffolk v. Long
Island Lighting Co., 554 F. Supp. 399 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); National Tank Truck
Carriers, Inc. v Burke, 535 F. Supp. 509 (D.R.I. 1982), aff'd, 698 F.2d 559 (1st Cir.
1983); United States v. City of N.Y., 463 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Marshall v.
Consumers Power Co., 65 Mich. App. 237, 237 N.W.2d 266 (1975).
29. See South Dakota Pub. Util. Comm'n v. FERC, 690 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1982)
(denial by Wisconsin Public Service Commission of permit to construct nuclear
power plant on economic and "needs" grounds upheld); Illinois v. Kerr-McGee
Chem. Corp., 677 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff City of Chicago's claim under
common law nuisance theory not preempted as applied to offsite dumps if hazards
protested were non-radiation hazards); Marshall v. Consumers Power Co., 65
Mich. App. 237, 237 N.W.2d 266 (1975) (plaintiffs claims under Michigan
Environmental Protection Act and common law nuisance theory were not
preempted by federal law; however, court held plaintiff did not state a cause of
action under the Michigan statute).
30. See, e.g., Illinois v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 677 F.2d at 578, 582 (City of
Chicago's claim that "dumping of hazardous material as fill constitutes...the
creation of a public nuisance" is within the authority of the local government to
prosecute); National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. v. Burke, 535 F. Supp. at 516

("deference should be given to state highway safety regulations because the state
generally knows best how to handle problems unique to the area."); United States
v. City of N.Y., 463 F. Supp. at 607,613 (City of New York, in defense of its denial of
an operating license to a Columbia University nuclear reactor, argued that "the
decision denying Columbia a certificate [was a] proper exercise of their police
power to regulate [siting] on the fringe of a federally preempted area...."); Marshall
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The leading and first case of its type was Northern
States Power Co. v. Minnesota.3 1 Minnesota's standards for
waste disposal permits, imposing more stringent
32
requirements than those specified by federal law,
succumbed to the permit-seekers' challenge. 33 The Eighth
Circuit announced that the "states possess no authority to
regulate radiation hazards unless pursuant to the execution
of an agreement surrendering federal control" where such
an agreement was authorized by federal law. 3 4 Minnesota's
plea that it be allowed to exercise its police power to protect
citizens from nuclear waste in
the health and safety of its
35
ears.
deaf
on
fell
the state
The reasoning in Northern States has been a consistent
and effective roadblock to non-federal attempts to regulate
nuclear hazards. 36 In United States v. City of New York, the
district court invalidated a dual system of licensing and
regulation under both federal and city laws. 37 The city's
purpose was found to be the prevention of "injury resulting
from an accidental release of radiation" and the resulting
regulation was preempted. 38 In Illinois v. GeneralElectric
Co., the Seventh Circuit declared unconstitutional on
preemption grounds the Illinois Spent Fuel Act, that
prohibited most imports of spent nuclear fuel. 39 The First

v. Consumers Power Co., 65 Mich. App. 237,237 N.W.2d at 282 ("The Atomic Energy
Act has allowed for [state common law remedies] for the health, safety and welfare
of its citizens.").
31. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd,
405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
32. Id. at 1145.
33. Id. at 1149-51.
34. Id. at 1149.
35. Id. at 1153.
36. See Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d at 206 (7th Cir. 1982); Illinois v.
Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 677 F.2d at 579 (7th Cir. 1982); County of Suffolk v. Long
Island Lighting Co., 554 F. Supp. at 404 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); United States v. City of
N.Y., 463 F. Supp. at 608-09, (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Marshall v. Consumers Power Co., 65
Mich. App. 237, 237 N.W.2d 266, at 274, 279 (1975).
37. 463 F. Supp. at 605.
38. Id. at 614.
39. 683 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1982).
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Circuit affirmed the district court in National Tank Truck
Carriersv. Burke which declared Rhode Island regulations
governing the transportation of hazardous materials
through its boundaries to be preempted.40 A state
referendum in Washington also sought to prohibit the
transportation and storage within Washington of
radioactive waste from outside the state. It, too, was found
to be preempted by the Atomic Energy Act. 4 1 The City of

New York tried to invalidate the final rule promulgated by
the Department of Transportation for transportation of
radioactive materials. Judge Sofaer of the district court
found the one purpose of the federal rule was to "override
local prohibitions against the shipment of radioactive
materials .... -42 He suggested that this rule was aimed
43
particularly at the New York City efforts.
Some localities, attempting to be less direct in their
regulation in the hope of averting preemption challenges,
were fairly inventive. Rhode Island's requirement of a
twenty year bond to be posted by a nuclear power company
to cover possible decontamination costs was exposed as an
indirect regulation in the federally preempted field. 44 Even
the complaint of the New York County of Suffolk was found
to be preempted when it tried to prevent the operation of a
nuclear power plant within its borders by asserting that
there were deficiencies in the design and construction of the
plant, evidence of noncompliance with Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) standards. 45 The court found that
"since the allegations of the complaint involve the
construction and operation of a nuclear reactor, they

40. 535 F. Supp. 509 (D.R.I. 1982), aff'd, 698 F.2d 559 (1st Cir. 1983).
41. Washington State Bldg. Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627
(9th Cir. 1982).
42. City of N.Y. v. United States Dep't. of Transp., 539 F. Supp. 1237,1241, rev'd
on othergrounds, 715 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1403 (1984).
43. Id. at 1241.
44. United Nuclear Corp. v. Cannon, 553 F. Supp. 1220 (D.R.I. 1982).
45. County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 554 F. Supp. 399 (E.D.N.Y.
1983).
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concern radiological hazards and safety, a field that the
AEA's legislative history and judicial construction indicate
46
is preempted by federal law."
III.

Pacific Gas & Electric

Against this history of federal preemption California
passed the Warren-Alquist Act in 1974. As stated in the Act,
the purpose of the legislation was to:
employ a range of measures to reduce wasteful,
uneconomical, and unnecessary uses of energy, thereby
reducing the rate of growth of energy consumption,
prudently conserve energy resources, and assure
statewide environmental, public safety, and land use
47
goals.
In 1976, the California Legislature passed three
amendments to the Warren-Alquist Act "to discourage the
passage of Proposition 15, a voter initiative that would have
eliminated nuclear power in California for the foreseeable
future." 48 Perhaps ironically, the amendment which was to
prove most controversial, and the only one to be reviewed by
the Supreme Court, would have effectively blocked new
construction or certification of nuclear power plants in
California. Section 25524.2 prohibited "land use" by or
certification of a nuclear power plant until the State Energy
Resources Conservation and Development Commission
"finds that there has been developed and that the United
States through its authorized agency has approved and

46. Id. at 404.
47. Warren-Alquist Act, § 25007.
48. Note, California's Nuclear Power Regulations: Federal Preemption?, 9
Hastings Const. L.Q. 623,623 (1982). The Ninth Circuit, in Pacific Legal Found. v.
State Energy Resources Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n, 659 F.2d 903, 924 (9th Cir.
1981), said the following about Proposition 15:
Proposition 15 would have ultimately barred any nuclear plants in California,
unless (1) the federal limit on liability for nuclear accidents...[the PriceAnderson Act], was removed; (2) the California Legislature determined reactor
safety systems to be adequate; and (3) the California Legislature determined
that nuclear waste could be stored without danger to the public.

9
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there exists a demonstrated technology or means for the
disposal of high-level nuclear waste." 49 As "this technology
does not presently exist and is not expected to exist until the
mid-1990's" 50 this section's effect was to ban certification
and construction of new nuclear power plants in
51
California.
Prior to applying to the state for a construction permit,
Pacific Gas and Electric Company, a California utility
company, had already spent $10,000,000 and several years
in planning a nuclear powered generating facility.52 It now

faced a major legal battle. At this point in the development
of California's scheme, the utility and its co-complainants
challenged the amendments. The preemption challenge
was sustained in the district court,5 3 but failed at the circuit
court 54 and Supreme Court5 5 levels.

The Supreme Court found only section 25524.2 of the
challenged provisions ripe for review. 56 This is the section
that actually imposed the moratorium on new use and
construction of nuclear power plants. The state claimed
economic infeasibility of temporary storage of nuclear
waste as the rationale for the challenged statute.5 7 The

49. Warren-Alquist Act, § 25524.2.
50. Note, supra note 48, at 624 (citing Report to the President by the Interagency
Review Group on Nuclear Waste Management 35 (1979)).
51. It was at this point that the California Assembly Subcommittee on Energy
asked its Special Counsel, Prof. Laurence H. Tribe of Harvard Law School, to
prepare a report on the constitutionality of California's nuclear laws. See Tribe,
California Declines the Nuclear Gamble: Is Such a State Choice Preempted?,7
Ecology L. Q. 679 (1979) (hereinafter cited as Tribe).
52. Petitioners' Brief at 10, Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources
Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 1713 (1983).
53. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conserv. & Dev.
Comm'n, 489 F. Supp. 699 (E.D. Cal. 1980).
54. Pacific Legal Found. v. State Energy Resources Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n,
659 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1981), aff'd sub nom. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State
Energy Resources Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 1713 (1983).
55. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n,
103 S. Ct. 1713 (1983).
56. Id. at 1720.
57. Respondents' Brief at 2-8, Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources
Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 1713 (1983).
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major thrust of the preemption challenge was that the
statute was an attempt by California to regulate nuclear
reserved to the
hazards for safety reasons, a function
58
Commission.
Nuclear Regulatory
Specifically, the utility company petitioners, along with
the United States as amicus curiae, claimed the statute was
preempted by the Atomic Energy Act because it regulated
construction of nuclear plants,5 9 because it was "predicated
on safety concerns-ignores the division between federal
60
and state authority created by the Atomic Energy Act,"
because it conflicted "with decisions concerning the nuclear
waste disposal issue made by Congress and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission', 61 and because it "frustrates the
federal goal of developing nuclear technology as a source of
energy." 6 2 In holding that the statute was not preempted,
the Court easily disposed of the utility companies'
63
objections.
Disagreeing with the assertion that the statute invaded
an exclusive federal regulatory realm, the Court pointed out
the traditional role of the states in the regulation of electric
utilities in questions concerning "need, reliability, cost, and
other related state concerns." 6 4 Citing the seminal case of
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., the Court noted that when
Congress legislates in a field traditionally reserved to the
states, the assumption exists that "'the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose
of Congress."' 6 5 As stated before, there is nothing in the
legislative history of the Atomic Energy Act and its
amendments that indicates exactly what the state role
58. Act of Sept. 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-373, § 274, 73 Stat. 688 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021(c)(4) (1976 & Supp. V 1981), 2021(k) (1976).
59. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 52, at 41-42.
60. 103 S. Ct. at 1722; Petitioners' Brief, supra note 52, at 46, 49.
61. 103 S. Ct. at 1722; Petitioners' Brief, supra note 52, at 39.
62. 103 S. Ct. at 1722; Petitioners' Brief, supra note 52, at 33-35.
63. 103 S. Ct. at 1722.
64. Id. at 1723.
65. Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
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would be in relation to its traditional exercise of power in the
area. 66 The states are merely reassured that they can
continue to exercise that power. 6 7 The Court found from this
lack of legislative direction that the states are not expressly
required to construct or authorize nuclear power plants.
They are not even prohibited "from deciding, as an absolute
or conditional matter, not to permit the construction of any
further reactors." 68 Even the later amendments to the
Atomic Energy Act, providing only a minimal amount of
additional direction, were found by the Court to allow
continued exercise of state traditional authority in this
field. 69 Further, the Court rejected the contention that the
true motive for the statute was concern for safety, not
economic infeasibility as asserted. 70 Relying on this least
defensible position, the Court found the statute "outside the
71
occupied field of nuclear safety regulation."
The Court found in NRC's licensing powers the authority
to decide whether or not a particular facility should be
built. 7 2 It did not find NRC authority to mandate the
building. 73 The NRC, it said, makes safety, not economic,

determinations. 74
While acknowledging that the Atomic Energy Act's
purpose is to promote the development of commercial use of
nuclear power, the Court refused to see this objective as a
mandate to states to construct nuclear power plants. 7 The
Court's analysis of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982
(the new law), 76 passed in the middle of this litigation,
revealed that Congress, while thoroughly committed to
66. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
67. Id.; see also 103 S. Ct. at 1723-26.
68. 103 S. Ct. at 1722.
69. Id. at 1725.
70. Id. at 1728.
71. Id. at 1728.
72. Id. at 1725.
73. Id. at 1722.
74. Id. at 1729.
75. Id. at 1731.
76. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-425,1982 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News (96 Stat.) 2201 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 10101).
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proper storage and treatment of nuclear waste,7 7 has never
retreated from its commitment to "further development of
nuclear power for electricity generation. '7 8 However, it was
also clear to the Court that the new law was not meant to
force the states to perform any affirmative acts. 79 As the
Court pointed out, the final language of the new federal law
was developed to avoid preempting this challenged state
provision. 80 However, "Congress has allowed the States to
determine-as a matter of economics-whether a nuclear
plant vis-h-vis a fossil fuel plant should be built." 8 1 The
Court found that the authority of states to choose not to
build nuclear power plants because they were economically
82
infeasible was not preempted by Congress.
IV.

Analysis of Pacific Gas & Electric

Present throughout the Court's analysis is the naive
acceptance of California's position that its statute was not
based on safety concerns. 83 The adroit urging of this theory
made little impression on the district court, which held the
entire regulatory scheme duplicative of and preempted by
federal regulations. 8 4 The Ninth Circuit, however, found
that section 25524.2 and its companion amendments
concocted by the State Energy Resources Conservation and
Development Commission as an alternative measure if a
referendum requiring similar state action was defeated,8 5

77. 103 S. Ct. at 1730.
78. Id.
79. Id.

80. Id.
81. Id. at 1731.
82. Id. at 1732.
83. The California regulatory scheme is replete with references to health and
safety of the people of the state. See Warren-Alquist Act, §§ 25001, 25007, 25309,
25511, 25520, 25523.
84. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n,
489 F. Supp. at 704.
85. Lodge, Melting Down PreemptiveFederal Regulation of Nuclear PowerPacificLegal Foundationv. State Energy Resources Commission, 14 Tol. L. Rev.
57, 62 (1982) and Tribe, supra note 51, at 680 n.5.
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"is directed towards purposes other than protection against
radiation hazards." 86 The Supreme Court not only accepted
any inquiry of its
the circuit court's conclusion, it declined
87
own into the legislative purpose.
A preemption analysis must be based on examination of
either the effect or potential effect of a statute. 88 It is logical

86. Pacific Legal Found. v. State Energy Resources Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n,
659 F.2d at 925; see also County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 554 F.
Supp. at 404.
87. 103 S. Ct. at 1728. Whether or not the Supreme Court reviews theintended or
stated purpose of a statute depends on which constitutional grounds the statute
was challenged. It is not necessary that the Supreme Court review the legislative
purpose behind a state statute in an equal protection challenge, only that the

statute bear a "rational relation to the State's objectives." (Minnesota v. Clover
Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470 (1981)). However, in the areas of
environmental protection and resource conservation, the stated purpose of the
legislation must be reviewed against any effects limited by the Commerce Clause.
Id. at 471. In Philadelphiav.New Jersey the Court examined the purposes of the
legislation to determine its intended effect. 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). It was the
intended effect that the Court found objectionable. See also Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). In preemption analysis the Court will examine the
purpose of a state statute when there is no existing, but only a possible conflict
with a federal statute, as is the case here. Note, supranote 48, at 630. In PacificGas
& Electric, 103 S.Ct. 1713 (1983), the Court disdained its own inquiry into the
legislative purpose of the state's moratorium. It accepted the conclusion of the
Ninth Circuit that the statute was based on economic concerns, well within the
state's authority. Since the validity of the statute hinged on whether it was based
on nuclear safety concerns, a field in which the state had no jurisdiction, it might
have behooved the Court to look more deeply into the purpose and intended effect
of the statute. As stated above, the Court in the past has examined legislative
purpose when ruling on the constitutionality of a state statute.
88. In FloridaLime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963), the
Court examined the constitutionality of a California statute restricting the
marketing of avocados, an area in which the federal government had also
legislated. The Court, citing Hines v.Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) stated the
test of preemption as "whether the state regulation 'stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives ofCongress .."
373 U.S. at 141. In other words, a state statute could be preempted if the court found
its potential effect would be an "actual conflict between the two schemes of
regulation [so] that both cannot stand in the same area...." Id. at 141. In Perez v.
Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971), the Court examined the effect on the federal
bankruptcy laws of an Arizona regulatory scheme to ensure compensation for
automobile accident victims. The Court found that the effect of the state
legislation would be to override a discharge in bankruptcy by a federal court, a
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that analysis of a statute that has not yet taken effect would
have to include examination of its intended effect. It seems
ludicrous to assert that any interest in the storage of nuclear
waste excludes a safety-related concern.8 9 Professor Tribe,
who analyzed the constitutionality of California's nuclear
scheme at the request of its legislature in 1978,90 said at that
time that the state's concern with permanent disposal of
nuclear waste stemmed from public anxiety about
"indefinite accumulation of highly radioactive materials
[which] would pose problems of uncertain, but certainly
mounting magnitude." 9 1 By its insistence on a federally
approved permanent waste disposal program, Professor
Tribe said, "the State of California protects its citizens not
only from the hazards of radiation but also from the
anxieties of uncertainty." 92 California's brief, however,
asserted that the California laws "reflect no more than the
State's determination, given its already heavy commitment
to nuclear power, to defer dependence on further increments
of nuclear generation to the day when obstacles to the
93
reliable operation of nuclear plants have been removed."

result clearly in violation of the Supremacy Clause. Thus, preemption analysis can
also be based on the effect of the statute in question.

89.
High-level radioactive wastes...are so radiotoxic that they must be permanently
removed from the biosphere....While these high-level wastes remain stored in
surface or near-surface facilities awaiting the development of a technology for
their permanent disposal, they carry an immediate potential for immeasurable

devastation as a result of accident or vandalism or terrorism.
Tribe, supra note 51, at 706-07. High-level radioactive wastes, which consist of

spent fuel, are so highly radioactive that "[t]he radioactivity decreases by a factor
of 1000 over the first ten years, but it takes one thousand more years for the
radioactivity to decrease by another factor of 1000. For permanent disposal, these
wastes...must be isolated in a stable environment for time spans on the order of a
quarter of a million years." Note, supra note 48, at 645.
90. Tribe, supra note 51, at 679.
91. Id. at 708.
92. Id. at 709.
93. Respondents' Brief at 40-41. It is interesting to note that Professor Tribe

represented California before the Supreme Court in this case.
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V.

The Real Issue: State Sovereignty

Curiously, California's position throughout the course of
this litigation never included that of sovereignty over its
own land. This concept, well-founded in common law and
federal history, might have been successfully asserted in
support of California's right to ban construction and
certification of new nuclear power plants.
When California entered the Union, the terms of its
entrance included the cession of federal land to that already
possessed by the territory, to become the state's own
sovereign land. 94 Under the Supremacy, 95 Property,96 and
Commerce Clauses, 97 and even the treaty power of the
United States Constitution, 98 the federal government has
infringed many times on state sovereignty, 99 especially in

94. Act of Sept. 9, 1850, ch. 50, 9 Stat. 452 (1862); see California ex rel. State
Lands Comm'n v. United States, 457 U.S. 273, 277 (1982); California v. Arizona,
440 U.S. 59, 60 (1979); California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 675 (1978); United
States v. California, 436 U.S. 32, 35 n.7, 37, 41 (1978); United States v. California,
332 U.S. 19,36 (1947); Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243,259,260,263(1913);
see also Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518(1938); Christianson v.
King County, 239 U.S. 356 (1915); Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 513 (1896);
Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
95. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. See supra note 28.
96. U.S. Const. art IV, § 3, cl. 2. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, reh'g
denied, 429 U.S. 873 (1976), (upholding the Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros

Act).
97. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979)
(invalidating Oklahoma law prohibiting export of minnows caught in the state's
waters).
98. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920)
(invalidating a state action interfering with a treaty with Great Britain
concerning migratory birds).
99. E.g., Aminoil U.S.A., Inc. v. California State Water Res. Control Bd., 674
F.2d 1227 (9th Cir. 1982) (federal government did not have to get state permit to
build a water project in California); Hayfield N.R.R. Co. v. Chicago & North
Western Transp. Co., 693 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1982) (state law allowing
condemnation of railroad property preempted by plenary power of the Interstate
Commerce Commission over abandoned railroad property); United States v. City
of Pittsburg, Cal., 661 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1981) (municipal trespass ordinance
requiring U.S. Postal Service letter carriers to get express permission from
residents before crossing their lawns preempted); City of Blue Ash v. McLucas, 596
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the areas of wildlife and environmental protection. 100 There
is no evidence in case law, however, indicating a state has
ever been forced to allow undesired construction by a
private concern not in partnership with the federal
government.101 Even the establishment of federal military
bases must be by consent of the state, according to the
10 2
United States Constitution.
If the Supreme Court had held the California moratorium
preempted, it would have, in effect, ordered the state to allow
construction of new nuclear plants by utility companies. A
private, profit-making venture, a nuclear power plant could

F.2d 709 (6th Cir 1979) (for purposes of regulation of the flight of airplanes to
control noise, regulation of air space above a state was preempted); Trailer Train
Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 511 F. Supp. 553 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (state power to
tax railroad property within its borders was preempted by the Railroad
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976); United States v. Town of
Windsor, Conn., 496 F. Supp. 581 (D. Conn. 1980) (state and town could not impose
building requirements on a construction project jointly sponsored by the federal
government and a private contractor).
100. E.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield, 435 U.S. 151 (1978) (regulation of oil tankers
by state of Washington preempted by the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of
1972); Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 873 (1976)
(upholding the Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act); City of Burbank v.
Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973) (local noise regulation preempted
by federal Quiet Communities Act of 1978); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416
(1920) (upheld treaty protecting migratory birds); Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d
1240 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982) (court would not sustain a
state challenge to the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act of 1978-the
state maintained that the Act's regulations affected its own land as well as the
federal land-the court said Congress had the power to regulate conduct off the
public land that menaced the public land); Anderson Seafoods, Inc.v. Graham, 529
F. Supp. 512 (N.D. Fla. 1982) (state coastal waters fishing regulation largely
preempted by a federal coastal waters fishing statute except within a specifically
designated area of state authority). See generallyEnvironmental Law Institute,
The Evolution of National Wildlife Law (1977).
101. Compare United States v. Town of Windsor, Conn., 496 F. Supp. 581 (D.
Conn. 1980) (state and town could not impose building requirements on a
construction project jointly sponsored by the federal government and a private
contractor). The author acknowledges that a state defeat in a controversy over
construction on a wetland might indirectly constitute "forcing" a state to allow
undesired construction by a private concern. This situation, however, would
reflect more strongly the defeat of a state's siting preference, rather than defeat of
a state's desire to prohibit that construction anywhere within its borders.
102. U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 17.
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be installed within the state's borders at the order of a
federal court. Manifestly, such an order would be beyond the
power of the federal government.
Courts have not questioned the authority of the states in
the area of property and land use law as long as no conflict
with a federal governmental interest arose. 10 3 Sometimes,
even in the presence of conflict, the federal government has
10 4
to defer to or at least comply with state property law.
When the federal government has interest in a state's
land, "the States of the Union and the National
Government may make mutually satisfactory
arrangements as to jurisdiction of territory within their
borders ....
'105 The federal government may also assert its
power of eminent domain. 106 Generally, however, the
federal government respects the sovereignty of a state over
its own land.
Most of these property matters are deemed to be the
exclusive jurisdiction of the states. Distribution of the
estates of deceased persons within its borders is a matter
exclusively reserved to the states.107 Distribution of marital
108
property within a state is its own exclusive jurisdiction.

103. N.Robinson, Environmental Regulation of Real Property (1982). Prof.
Robinson summarized the state of the law in this field: "While Congress
traditionally has left land use controls to state government as a matter of policy, it
has not hesitated to ignore its policy preference whenever it wished." Id. at 3-4. He
cites the imposition of federal environmental laws such as the Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. V 1981), whose air quality standards, in some cases,
cannot be met by land use control. Id.
104. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978) (federal government cannot
impound unappropriated water for a federal reclamation project without
complying with state law-note that water and water rights are considered
property). See also G. Thompson, Courts and Water: The Role of the Judicial
Process 7 (National Water Commission Monograph No. NWC-L-72-055, 1972).
105. Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, 528 (1938).
106. Id. at 530.
107. Christianson v. King County, 239 U.S. 356, 365 (1915).
108. See McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 228 (1981) (acknowledged state
sovereignty in this area but invalidated community property award of part of
husband's federal military retirement pay only because Congress specifically
exempted it from being "attached to satisfy a property settlement incident to the
dissolution of a marriage."); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979)
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Zoning laws, except those that offend constitutional
notions of equal opportunity and due process 09 are the
110
states' own domain.
Against this background of judicial deference to state
sovereignty in the areas of property and land use, it is
difficult to understand why this issue was not raised by
either the parties or the courts. Although Professor Tribe
referred to them in the study he prepared for the California
State Legislature,"1 it was not raised at any level of the
Pacific Gas & Electriclitigation. Perhaps it was too risky to
allow the Supreme Court a chance to say that the states,
even in the absence of a specific federal exertion of eminent
domain or supremacy, cannot control construction on their
own sovereign land.
VI.

Conclusion

In Pacific Gas & Electric, the Supreme Court upheld a
California statute which purported to regulate, but, in
(invalidated community property award of part of husband's benefits under the
Railroad Retirement Act because Congress specifically excluded ex-spouses from
receiving them. The Court said "state family and fa. .ily-property law must do
'major damage' to 'clear and substantial' federal interests before the Supremacy
Clause will demand that state law be overridden." (quoting United States v.
Yazell, 382 U.S. 341,352 (1966))). See also Buckholz v. Buckholz, 197 Neb. 180, 248
N.W.2d 21 (1976).
109. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (zoning
ordinance excluding grandsons as "family" for purposes of being a member of a
single family unit violated the Due Process Clause). Cf. Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (no violation of Equal
Protection Clause by a zoning pattern whose impact was racially discriminatory.
However, the Court left the impression that if proof of discriminatory intent was
offered, it would have found the zoning practice unconstitutional). Cf. Belle Terre
v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (no violation of the Equal Protection Clause by an
ordinance restricting land use to one family dwellings which defined members of
the family as those related by blood, marriage or adoption. However, if the Court
had not found a rational state purpose for the classification, it would have had
grounds for a finding of unconstitutionality).
110. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
111. "Since California seeks to eliminate land-use which creates a continuing
source of public fear and unrest, it is exercising a traditional land-use power...."
Tribe, supra note 51, at 709-10.
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effect, prevented the operation and construction of new
nuclear power plants in California. The traditional
preemption challenge to state initiated legislation in this
field, previously successful in almost every case, failed.
California built a defense around the economics of nuclear
power, the only realm of authority Congress clearly left to
the states. This defense disowned the actual language
throughout the statutory scheme of the Warren-Alquist Act
which clearly sets forth the state's preoccupation with the
health and safety of its citizens, an area specifically
reserved to the federal nuclear agency to protect. Despite
this clear conflict between state and federal authority, the
Supreme Court held the statute to be a valid exercise of the
state's powers. The threshold question, that of the state's
sovereignty over its own territory, was never reached.
The decision, however, actually extended state authority
in the nuclear regulatory field further than ever beforeperhaps beyond where consideration of state sovereignty
would have led. If economic reasons are now sufficient for a
state to initiate previously prohibited regulation, there
could be a major erosion of federal preemption in the nuclear
regulatory field. For example, could a state now refuse a
siting permit for a nuclear powered facility because of the
potential adverse impact on the local land values resulting
from fears about nuclear safety? If the answer is yes, there
may ultimately be little left of preemption in this area unless
Congress further extends the scope of the authority of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Marla B. Rubin
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